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The relationship between globalization and employment is of growing significance to policy 
makers in developing countries, but is surprisingly difficult to analyse theoretically and empirically. 
‘Globalization’ means different things to different analysts and it is so multi-faceted that its effects are 
difficult to isolate and evaluate. Received trade theory does not provide a clear guide to its 
employment effects and in its most commonly used version it assumes away many factors that affect 
employment during globalization. Much finally depends on the ability of each country to cope with the 
liberalised trade, investment and technology flows that globalization implies. As this ability varies 
widely across the developing world – and is continuing to diverge between countries – it appears that 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper discusses the analytical framework of the globalisation-employment relationship in 
developing countries, focusing on the manufacturing sector. This relationship is surprisingly difficult 
to define and measure (Ghose, 2001), for many reasons. Globalisation is a multi-faceted phenomenon, 
and each facet may have different effects on employment, varying by country, time, industry, policies 
and the like.
2 It comes as a part of large array of economic, technical, social, legal and policy changes, 
each with interactions and feedbacks, making is difficult to separate the effects of globalisation. 
Different analysts tend to focus on different aspects of globalisation, thus often talking at cross 
purposes. Even when an unambiguous definition is used – say, globalisation taken only as increased 
trade flows – received theory is unable to provide a clear guide on its employment effects.  
This suggests that a generalisable relationship between globalisation and employment in 
developing countries as a whole may not exist. The relationship is, rather, context specific, dynamic 
and changeable, reflecting particular interactions in each economy between the external facets of 
globalisation (e.g. shrinking economic distance, greater trade or the spread of international 
production) that apply to the economy and internal factors that affect its employment response. In 
analytical terms, there are three sets of factors at work in the globalisation-employment relationship, 
each with a differing theoretical and empirical tradition: 
1.  The static reallocation of employed labour in response to globalisation.  
2.  The dynamic growth effects of closer integration of economies with the globalised system, 
depending on the ability of each economy to provide the capabilities needed to grow in a 
closer knit, technology driven and highly competitive international economy. 
3.  The mode of insertion of the economy into the global system (e.g. by greater primary 
exports, subcontracting of low-technology activities, local firms entering global value 
chains or attraction of high technology processes or functions).  
Much of the existing literature on globalisation and employment falls into the first category, 
in the tradition of received comparative advantage theory and defining globalisation as a rise in trade. 
This is a very useful approach, and allows for rigorous econometric testing of the causal link between 
enhanced trade and employment. However, it is essentially static, and ignores dynamic interactions 
between globalisation and domestic capabilities, growth and competitiveness. Clearly, such effects are 
likely to be very important, even dominant, in determining the employment effects of globalisation 
over time. However, they are difficult to model and quantify and this branch of analysis remains 
largely intuitive. Finally, the analysis of the mode of insertion is a relatively new topic, but it is of 
growing significance as it becomes apparent that different modes have increasingly differentiated 
growth and employment effects on developing countries.   
                                                 
2 Globalisation in the general sense of closer integration of national markets is not new (O’Rourke and Williamson, 
2000). Many economists date its efflorescence to the period following the great ‘voyages of discovery’ in 1492, which led to 
“a transfer of technology, plants, animals and diseases on an enormous scale, never seen before and probably since” (Lindert 
and Williamson, 2001, p. 2). This epoch of globalisation was prolonged (trade boomed until about 1820) but it faced ‘anti-
global’ forces like policy barriers to trade, monopolies, wars and insecurity. As a result of these, commodity prices remain 
highly dispersed between exporting and importing nations. The next epoch, 1820-1913, was more ‘pro-global’, with price 
dispersions falling, indicating better integration of economies. In this era, the industrial revolution transformed transport and 
communication technologies and colonialism imposed liberal rules of trade and investment. International migration boomed, 
foreign capital spread and trade barriers fell. The third epoch, the inter-war period (1913-1950), was ‘anti-global’: trade was 
restricted, overseas investments and technology flows fell and the price gaps between Atlantic trading partners doubled 
(ibid.). The current episode of globalisation is again strongly ‘pro-global’, with increasingly liberal trade and investment 
policies and strong international capital flows. However, it differs from earlier episodes (Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin, 
1999). Its main facilitator is rapid innovation in information and communications technologies and its main driver the spread 
of tightly knit global value chains, often under the direct control of transnational corporations. Labour migration, while 
growing, is less important than earlier. Transport costs are at historic lows. Liberalisation is more voluntary than imposed 
(though there are intense external pressures on developing countries). As a result, ‘economic space’ has shrunk to 
unprecedented levels, with global markets for products, finance, information, technology and services more closely knit than 
ever before and with productive activities increasingly integrated across countries under common governance.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS93   Page 3 
DEFINITIONS AND MEASURES 
To most economists ‘globalisation’ means the closer integration of economies via trade and factor 
flows. But this permits many interpretations of how this can be measured. To some, globalisation is 
indicated b y relative commodity prices between trading nations; O’Rourke and Williamson (2000) 
call the convergence of relative prices the ‘central manifestation of globalisation’. But some measure 
globalisation by growth trade and factor (but capital rather than labour) flows, while others see it 
primarily as the policy process – economic liberalisation – that facilitates closer economic relations. 
Some have narrower definitions: the organisation and governance of global production systems (or 
value chains). In his n ew book on globalisation, Stiglitz (2002) addresses the international 
“institutions of globalisation”, the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO. Economic geographers mean 
by globalisation the shifts in the location of economic activity subsequent upon shrinking economic 
distance.
3 Outside economics, there is an even greater variety of definitions of globalisation; in 
popular critiques it is taken to be synonymous with capitalism, big business and multinational 
corporations. Some important indicators of globalisation, then, are as follows:  
•  Outcomes: The preferred outcome indicator of globalisation for economic historians is the 
convergence of product prices between exporting and importing countries, a good indirect measure 
of economic distance (transport and transaction costs in and policy barriers to trade) between 
economies. Globalisation is also manifested in rising flows of products, intermediate inputs, 
equipment, services, finance (loans, FDI and portfolio investment), information, technology and 
skills. The most commonly used measure relates to these, in particular to trade and capital. 
However, care has to be taken in interpreting outcome measures when the measures reflect other 
factors than globalisation and when the closer integration of economies does not result in greater 
trade or other flows. The latter point is particularly apt today as a number of developing countries 
opening themselves to global markets are not enjoying concomitant increases in exports or FDI. 
•  Transport and communication costs: Falling transport, information transmission and 
communication costs can be measured directly, and many analysts use them in discussions of 
globalisation.  
•  Policy liberalisation: Policies to facilitate freer trade, direct investment, borrowing and portfolio 
investment, privatization and so on are sometimes used to measure globalisation. The most 
common measures are that of ‘openness’ (most often trade/GDP ratios) or trade liberalisation 
(nominal tariffs, relative exchange rates, black market premia on exchange rates or qualitative 
indices of liberalisation
4). Openness and liberalisation measures are, however, hard to calculate: 
indicators of openness may be arbitrary, nominal tariffs may not capture the true incidence of 
barriers and other measures may be misleading.
5 In any case, it is not clear that they measure ‘true’ 
national participation in globalisation: a country may be participating more effectively in the 
globalised economy while retaining trade and other restrictions than by having completely liberal 
policies. In other words, given infant industry considerations and widespread information and 
coordination failures, it may be the case that countries can link to and leverage export markets and 
FDI more effectively by using selective interventions (Stiglitz, 2002, Lall, 2001).
6 Surely Korea 
                                                 
3 Thus, Crafts and Venables (2001, p. 2) “Globalisation is about the changing costs of economic interaction across 
distance and the effects of these changes on the geographical distribution of economic activity. Technical change has been 
driving the costs of interactions steadily downward for many centuries, though policy interventions have sometimes raised 
them. Changes in the economic geography of the world economy have been more complex. There have been periods when 
activity has become more unevenly distributed across space, and periods when these spatial differences have narrowed as 
activity has spread out of established centres into other regions and countries. The mechanisms driving these changes were, 
amongst other things, easier movement of people, capital and goods – globalisation”. 
4 For a brief discussion see Greenaway et al. (2002) and Sachs and Warner (1995).  
5 For critiques see, for instance, Birdsall and Hamoudi (2002) and Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999).  
6 As Rodrik (2001) notes, the most successful globalizing countries today are those that retain many forms of  policy 
intervention. Over recent industrial history, the most dynamic and competitive countries have been those that used industrial 
policy massively. For a fascinating study of how East Asian countries leveraged foreign technology, enterprises and markets 
to build their semiconductor industries, see Mathews and Cho (1999).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS93   Page 4 
and Taiwan in the heyday of their industrial policy were more ‘globalised’ than many African 
countries today that ‘adjusted’ according to IMF strictures? Thus, no unequivocal indicator of 
globalisation follows from policy analysis.  
•  Forms of globalisation: Some analysts take particular forms of globalised production as its 
manifestation. An important one is integrated production systems where an activity is 'fragmented' 
and processes or functions located in different countries, measured by the flow of parts and 
components for further processing.
7  
•  Actors in globalisation: Some people equate globalisation with the spread of TNCs and the 
growing dominance of large firms in global value chains. If this definition is accepted, the share of 
TNCs in various forms of economic activity becomes a good measure of globalisation. However, 
this is clearly a rather restricted measure, excluding many other dimensions of the phenomenon 
that do not involve direct equity participation. In fact, it even underestimates the importance of 
TNCs in economic life, since they rely increasingly on external suppliers and subcontractors. 
In sum, while most people seem to agree what globalisation is in general, there are no precise 
or optimal measures of g lobalisation. Given the inherent fuzziness of the concept, moreover, it is 
unlikely that a perfect measure will emerge.
8 This makes it very difficult to measure the impact of 
globalisation on anything. However, this does not make the analysis redundant. Quite the contrary: the 
fact that globalisation has so many aspects that ‘hang together’ makes it all the more important to 
discuss its impact, even in an imprecise way. Where measures are required, it would seem best to treat 
particular (quantifiable) aspects separately, acknowledging that this does not amount to a complete 
analysis of globalisation.  
Let us now consider the relationships between globalisation and employment under the 
headings of trade theory, dynamic growth effects and mode of insertion into global value chains.  
TRADE THEORY AND GLOBALISATION: COMPARATIVE STATICS  
In applying trade theory to globalisation and employment, many analysts take globalisation to be the 
rise in exports and imports consequent upon trade liberalisation. This narrow definition allows them to 
test with standard trade theories the impact of greater trade on the labour intensity of production in the 
static comparative setting that characterises most such theories. The most relevant theory is the 
canonical Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model, which deals with two factors of production (labour and 
capital) under simplifying assumptions of perfectly competitive markets and identical production 
functions with freely available technologies across countries. In this model, a rise in trade raises the 
demand for labour-intensive products in poor, labour-surplus countries: this is commonly taken to 
mean that H-O predicts employment growth in developing countries, but in strict theory this is not 
true. Since in H -O all markets clear with macroeconomic equilibrium and full employment 
throughout, a rise in trade can only cause an inter-sectoral shift towards labour-intensive activities 
(and so higher wages), not greater employment.
9  
                                                 
7 See Yeats (2001), whose paper appears in a book named ‘Fragmentation’ (Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001). 
8 A judicious combination of outcome measures (flows of goods, intermediates, FDI and so on) may be the best 
measure for empirical purposes. For instance, trade/GDP ratios (or manufactured trade/GDP ratios) may be used jointly with 
FDI, foreign licensing, trade in components, telecom or Internet usage to gain a better picture of participation in the global 
economy. It would seem better to exclude policy-based measures altogether and to discuss policy needs to benefit from 
globalisation separately. 
9 Fitzgerald and Perosino (1995) note that the H-O model “unambiguously predicts the direction of change of aggregate 
and sectoral employment and factors prices: output increases in the exportables sector and decreases in the importables 
sector as instantaneous adjustment takes place along the PPF [production possibilities frontier]. As the exportables sector is 
more labour intensive than importables, the change in the composition of employment increases the aggregate demand for 
labour and reduces that for capital. Consequently, the equilibrium real wage rises and capital rental falls. Aggregate 
employment does not increase because labour supply is rigid, but the increase in wages encourages producers to adopt more 
capital intensive techniques in both sectors.” (p. 4).  
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However, many analysts interpret the H-O model more realistically to include labour market 
rigidities and unemployment (Ghose, 2000). In this case, an increase in manufactured trade between 
developing (labour surplus) and developed (labour scarce) countries is likely to result in an increase 
in employment in the former. To the extent that globalisation implies greater trade (in this case 
working only through trade liberalisation), the prediction is clear for manufactures. Note that the 
prediction may not apply to trade in primary products, which are often capital intensive. Nor does it 
apply to South-South trade, where the outcome depends on relative factor endowments in trading 
partners (i.e. some developing countries are more capital endowed than others). It is a purely 
comparative static prediction – the time period is irrelevant since adjustment is instantaneous – and it 
depends solely on the shift of resources between activities using given technologies, not on the use of 
different or new technologies. In the canonical model, there are also no factor movements (i.e. no 
export-oriented FDI in developing countries) and no second order effects on other sectors.   
There is intuitive appeal in the simple H-O prediction. Export activity in developing countries 
does tend to be labour-intensive; the part led by TNCs is clearly driven by labour cost advantages. A 
shift of activity to export activity consequent upon liberalisation is thus likely to raise the employment 
intensity of manufacturing. The experience of export-oriented countries in the developing world 
supports this. They all launched exports in highly labour-intensive activities, and generated 
considerable employment as they expanded output. Evidence from country studies in Ghose (2000) 
suggests that “trade increases the employment elasticity of manufacturing” after liberalisation (this 
applies to China, India, Indonesia and Malaysia, p. 20-21). There are also second-order effects on 
employment in import-competing industries: by relieving the foreign exchange constraint or by 
attracting greater FDI, export growth r aises employment in these industries and, more important, 
raises the growth rate of the economy as a whole. This is in line with the general finding that export-
oriented economies grow faster than inward-oriented economies and that economies shifting from the 
latter to the former strategies enjoy increases in exports and growth. This export-growth relationship 
literature is well known and we return to it below.  
Even accepting this, however, there are reasons to question the predictions of trade theory. 
The canonical H-O model is based on endowments of two factors located within perfect markets. It 
ignores many imperfections that in real life determine industrial efficiency and competitiveness: 
technological leads and lags, scale and agglomeration economies, product differentiation, taste 
differences and the like. Once a large number of productive factors, including those based on 
enterprise-level effort, are introduced, it becomes difficult to define ‘endowments’ at the national 
level.
10 Thus, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, and to predict the impact of trade liberalisation on 
employment in manufacturing as a whole.
11  
New trade theory, as best exemplified by Grossman and Helpman (1990), takes technological 
differences, scale economies and externalities into account. While it uses more realistic assumptions 
than H -O, it does not produce unambiguous predictions for employment. To a large extent, the 
specific pattern of comparative advantage is indeterminate and opening up to trade does not show how 
factor use will change.
12 Once scale, agglomeration, externalities and the like are introduced into the 
                                                 
10 As Fitzgerald and Perosino (1995) note, once skills, quality, product differentiation are introduced, the employment 
consequences of liberalisation become very confused. Companies that can only compete by raising skill levels, introducing 
branded products or raising quality may not raise overall employment but only that of highly skilled workers. Total 
employment may fall as employment of specific classes of (competitiveness enhancing) workers rises.  
11 The H-O model also assumes instantaneous and frictionless adjustment. Once structural lags are introduced, there 
arises the issue of period of adjustment. Once a broad range of market failures is admitted it is no longer clear if adjustment 
will ever be complete, or, indeed, what the equilibrium is that the economy is moving towards. See Stiglitz (1996) for a 
discussion from the perspective of information economics.  
12 To quote Fitzgerald and Perosino (1995), “There are four main positive effects [under new trade theory]: (a) trade 
expands the output market of exporting industries and allows them to exploit economies of scale in production  and 
knowledge accumulation; (b) trade fosters technological spill-over as it provides access (at a cost) to the world stock of 
knowledge; (c) foreign competition reduces the duplication of R&D efforts and makes them more effective; and (d) the 
contraction of import-competing sectors can release skilled workers for exports. However, there are also negative effects. 
Liberalisation increases foreign competition and imitation, which can outweigh the enlargement of output market and reduce 
the return on investments in R&D. Latecomers are forced to relocate to stagnating industries, and unskilled-labour countries QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS93   Page 6 
trade model, there arises the possibility of multiple equilibria.
13 Thus, markets may clear at a low level 
or low growth equilibrium where developing countries specialize under free trade in low-technology, 
slow-growing activities. If, however, they can mount a concerted strategy to develop the skill and 
technology base necessary, they could arrive at a higher-level equilibrium. In such conditions, the 
impact of liberalisation on employment depends on which equilibrium is reached, which depends in 
turn on government policy.    
Spiezia (2002) and Vivarelli (2002) demonstrate the indeterminacy of employment outcomes 
of liberalisation under received trade theory. Spiezia notes that the H-O and technology gap theories 
of trade give opposing predictions of the impact of increased trade on employment in developing 
countries. The neoclassical theory predicts rising employment only when physical factor endowments 
are taken to be the only determinants of comparative advantage. If differences in factor productivity, 
sectoral productivity and demand patterns are introduced, the outcome is unpredictable. For instance, 
if the productivity gap between the developing and developed worlds were larger for labour than for 
capital, the former would end up exporting capital-intensive products and so creating less employment 
as a result of greater trade. In technology gap theories, with comparative advantage determined by 
technological  leads and lags rather than factor endowments, no prediction emerges at all about the 
impact of growing trade on employment. Developing countries will export low technology or 
traditional products, whether these are labour or capital intensive. Their employment creation relative 
to industrial countries will depend on relative rates of innovation and the relative demand for new and 
old goods. Statistical tests confirm that the employment impact of greater trade is indeterminate. In 
nearly half of the countries analysed, the labour intensity of exports is lower than that of non-traded or 
imported products.  
Vivarelli (2002) also notes various qualifications to the received trade models. Factor 
endowments cannot be compared easily across developing countries when there are countries at an 
intermediate level with higher labour endowments than mature industrial countries but lower than 
poorer countries. The impact of trade liberalisation cannot then be predicted for the developing world 
as a whole: a more differentiated model is called for. Moreover, a product intensive in low-skilled 
labour in an advanced economy may be demanding of relatively skilled labour in a developing one. 
This amounts to an effective factor-intensity reversal that makes generalisations on the employment 
impact impossible. If Wood’s (1994) model of H-O is adopted, with capital being mobile and skilled 
labour along with natural resources being the immobile local endowments, trade liberalisation has 
unpredictable effects on employment. Vivarelli also notes that H-O assumes each country to be on the 
same production function, with the same access to knowledge and without scale economies; if this 
assumption is dropped, and technologies allowed to differ in skill-intensities, the skill-biased nature of 
technical change would lead new technologies (introduced by trade and FDI liberalisation) to reduce 
the demand for unskilled labour in poor countries.  
Trade theory does not, therefore, permit any clear conclusions about employment once the 
strict and unrealistic H-O model is dropped. This is just what this chapter argues; however, note again 
that all such analysis is comparative static and does not take dynamic effects into account. Its testing 
uses a narrow definition of globalisation: increased trade. However, whether or not a country that 
exposes itself to world markets actually enjoys a sustained increase in trade is itself an issue. The 
relationship between globalisation and employment in each economy is determined by that economy’s 
capabilities, which depends in turn on national endowments and policies. The next section considers 
these factors.  
                                                                                                                                                        
are obliged to specialize in traditional industries with little technological spillover. Thus, liberalisation may not only 
interrupt the process of accumulation of new knowledge, but also cause the loss of that already accumulated”. (p. 16) 
13 See, for instance, Redding (1999) and Stokey (1991).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS93   Page 7 
GLOBALISATION AND EMPLOYMENT AS MEDIATED BY NATIONAL 
CAPABILITIES   
It is now a truism that export-oriented economies have done better than inward-oriented  ones in 
raising living standards, wages and employment in a sustained manner. However, this says little about 
whether 'globalisation' has been good for growth and employment in developing countries. The secret 
of export success in the most dynamic developing economies, ‘Tigers’ of East Asia, did not lie in 
passive liberalisation but in building domestic capabilities and leveraging international markets and 
resources (Mathews and Cho, 1999). Their experience is in sharp contrast to many more countries that 
liberalised their economies but failed to have comparable growth in exports, incomes or employment. 
There is, in other words, a vital missing link in the conventional approach to globalisation and 
employment – how countries manage the process of integrating into the global economy. The external 
forces of globalisation – shrinking economic distance, mobile resources and the like – only provide 
opportunities for employment generation. Whether a poor country seizes these opportunities or not 
depends on its ability to mount policies geared to competitiveness; these policies are often at sharp 
variance with the liberalisation associated with globalisation (i.e. the removal of the government from 
international trade, investment and technology flows). Given this missing link, it is fruitless to search 
for a general causal relationship between globalisation and employment.  
It is well known now that many successful 'Tiger' economies in Asia did not have liberal trade 
and FDI policies but used widespread interventions in trade, capital and technology flows to promote 
competitiveness (Stiglitz, 1996, Lall, 2001). Trade interventions provided a domestic base for 
building proficiency in export activities and in reaping scale economies; FDI interventions were used 
to strengthen the local technological base. Export orientation was, however, critical to the success of 
these interventions. It provided the competitive spur needed to force the development of capabilities 
in protected industries. 
Understanding this dynamic relationship between growth, participation in global markets and 
policy needs a deviation into the ‘technological capability’ approach to industrial development. Most 
trade theories, including new trade theory, assume that technology can be imported and used by 
developing countries without further effort, cost or uncertainty.
14 In other words, there is no learning 
process involved: if there is learning, it is passive and automatic learning-by-doing. As such it is 
largely predictable and economically trivial since it does not generate market failures (efficient capital 
markets can anticipate and finance such learning). This approach contrasts with the evolutionary 
approach to technology, in which firms do not operate on a neoclassical production function but in a 
‘fuzzy’ world where they have imperfect knowledge of a few technologies and need to expend effort 
in mastering, adapting and improving upon that technology. The possibility of localised technological 
progress with imperfect information and missing markets raises completely different considerations. 
Central to it is the existence of widespread market and institutional failures, the remedying of which is 
the key to industrial competitiveness (Box 1). 
The technological capability literature is based on the evolutionary theories of Nelson and 
Winter (1992).
15 The literature is highly empirical, building upon the experience of technological 
learning in enterprises in developing countries. It provides a complex explanation of industrial success 
involving market failures and efforts to overcome those failures. While its nature means that it is not 
amenable to conventional modelling based on optimization, it offers a very realistic explanation of 
different patterns of industrial success and comparative advantage in the developing world.  
Box 1  
Ten features of technological learning in developing countries 
                                                 
14 There is thus a sharp distinction made between industrial countries that innovate at the frontier and developing ones 
that use existing technologies. In the former, there are technological leads, externalities and possible market failures in 
innovation. In the latter, technology effectively vanishes as a determinant of comparative advantage, since no further effort is 
needed to use technologies efficiently. All the spillover benefits of technology can be reaped by simply opening up to world 
markets: using imported technologies does not raise any economic issues.  
15 For a simple and clear exposition see UNIDO (2002).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS93   Page 8 
1.  Technological learning is a real and significant process. It is vital to industrial development, and is 
primarily conscious and purposive rather than automatic and passive. Firms using a given technology for 
similar periods need not be equally proficient: each may be at the point given by the intensity and efficacy 
of its capability building efforts.  
2.  Firms do not have full information on technical alternatives. They function with imperfect, variable and 
rather hazy knowledge of technologies they are using. There is no uniform, predictable learning curve for a 
given technology: each firm may have a different learning experience, depending on its initial situation and 
subsequent efforts. Each faces risk, uncertainty and cost. Differences in learning are larger between 
countries at differing levels of development.  
3.  Firms may not know how to build up the necessary capabilities — learning itself often has to be learned. In 
a developing country, knowledge of traditional technologies may not be a good base on which to know how 
to master modern technologies. For a latecomer to a technology, the fact that others have already undergone 
the learning process is both a benefit and a cost. It is a benefit in that they can borrow from the others’ 
experience (to the extent this is accessible). It is a cost in that they are relatively inefficient during the 
process (and so have to bear a loss if they compete on open markets). The cost and risk depend on how new 
the technology is relative to the entrant’s base of knowledge, how developed factor markets are and how 
fast the technology is changing.  
4.  Firms cope with these uncertain conditions not by maximising a well-defined function but by developing 
organisational and managerial ‘satisficing’ routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). These are adapted as firms 
collect new information, learn from experience and imitate other firms. Learning is path dependent and 
cumulative.  
5.  The learning process is highly technology specific, since technologies differ in their learning requirements. 
Some technologies are more embodied in equipment while others have greater tacit elements. Process 
technologies (like chemicals) are more embodied than engineering technologies (machinery or 
automobiles), and demand different (often less) effort. Capabilities built up in one activity are not easily 
transferable to another. Different technologies involve different breadth of skills and knowledge, some 
needing a narrow range of specialization and others a wide range.  
6.  Different technologies have different degrees of dependence on outside sources of knowledge or 
information, such as other firms, consultants, capital goods suppliers or technology institutions.  
7.  Capability building occurs at all levels — shop-floor, process or product engineering, quality management, 
maintenance, procurement, inventory control, outbound logistics and relations with other firms and 
institutions. Innovation in the conventional sense of formal R&D is  at one end of the spectrum of 
technological activity; it does not exhaust it. However, R&D does become important as more complex 
technologies are used; R&D is needed just for efficient absorption.  
8.  Technological development can take place to different depths. The attainment of a minimum level of 
operational capability (know-how) is essential to all activity. This may not lead to the development of 
deeper capabilities, an understanding of the principles of the technology (know-why): this requires a 
discrete strategy to invest in deepening. The deeper the levels of technological capabilities aimed at, the 
higher the cost, risk and duration involved. It is possible for an enterprise to become efficient at the know-
how level and stay there, but this is not optimal for its long-term capability development. It will remain 
dependent on other firms for all major improvements to its technologies, and remain constrained in what it 
can obtain and use as a competitive tool. The development of know-why allows firms to select better the 
technologies they need, lower the costs of buying those technologies, realise more value by adding their 
own knowledge, and to develop autonomous innovative capabilities.  
9.  Technological learning is rife with externalities and inter-linkages. It is driven by direct interactions are 
with suppliers of inputs or capital goods, competitors, customers, consultants, and technology suppliers. 
Others are with firms in unrelated industries, technology institutes, extension services, universities, industry 
associations and training institutions. Many linkages are informal and based on trust. Where information 
and skill flows are particularly dense in a set of related activities, clusters of industries emerge, with 
collective learning for the group as a whole.  
10.  Technological interactions occur within a country and abroad. Imported technology provides the most 
important input into technological learning in developing countries. Since technologies change constantly, 
moreover, access to foreign sources of innovation is vital to continued technological progress. Technology 
import is not, however, a substitute for indigenous capability development — the efficacy with which 
imported technologies are used depends on local efforts. Similarly, not all modes of technology import are QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS93   Page 9 
equally conducive to indigenous learning. Much depends on how the technology is packaged with 
complementary factors, whether or not it is available from other sources, how fast it is changing, how 
developed local capabilities are, and the policies adopted to stimulate transfer and deepening.  
Source: Lall (2001). 
The admission of technological capabilities as a determinant of competitive advantage 
changes the relationship of trade liberalisation with employment. As Lall and Latsch (2001) say,  
“In the standard neoclassical formulation it is often assumed that such processes [of 
building firm-level technological efficiency] are costless and automatic: in the simplest case, 
firms choose technologies under conditions of perfect information. Under these conditions, 
there is no need to delve into what goes on within firms, since market prices by definition 
give the correct signals for investments in capital, labour and technology. This formulation 
is based on the metaphor of an economy as an equilibrium system: Stiglitz correctly points 
out that such a metaphor ‘provides little insight into the dramatic changes that occur in 
[developing] societies’ (1996, p.154). 
A different conceptualization of firm-level processes yields very different 
conclusions: in the presence of market failures markets will not, by themselves, give the 
correct signals to guide the allocation of resources in accordance with a more dynamic view 
of comparative advantage. This is true, for example, in the case of widespread information 
imperfections. In such cases, free trade and import liberalisation may not be the best policy 
for developing countries undergoing structural change and adjustment.  This is not to deny 
that increased competition through trade may still be beneficial  in highly protected and 
technologically backward economies; the point is that free markets will not by themselves 
result in a more desirable outcome. The design of liberalisation has to take account of the 
extent and type of market failure. In the simplest neoclassical models, market failures are 
narrowly circumscribed and it is possible to correct them with a minimum of intervention. 
However, recent advances in information economics suggest that under conditions of 
widespread informational failures (and with realistic assumptions regarding the distribution, 
acquisition, and processing of information), free market outcomes may not even be 
constrained Pareto-efficient. It can be shown that there generally exists a set of Pareto-
improving government interventions, even if the government faces the same informational 
constraints as private agents. Information economics stresses the ubiquity of market failure, 
and the pervasiveness of imperfect information.” (P. 59) 
The learning stressed by the technological capability approach applies to existing activities as 
well as to new ones. Where some learning has taken place but has been distorted by past interventions 
policies should promote ‘re-learning’ competitive capabilities. This, again, cannot be a costless, 
automatic and instantaneous process but involves time, investment, risk and effort. Simply exposing 
industries to import competition will benefit only those that have already undergone their learning and 
are competitive, or are so near the frontier. It will wipe out others, forcing them into cost cutting 
strategies that do not raise their technological levels and do not give a lasting competitive advantage, 
or force them into less exposed activities (say, with a local natural resource base).  
Thus, the impact of import liberalisation on industrial performance and employment depends 
on two sets of factors: the speed and spread of liberalisation, and the level of development of 
technological capabilities at the time of liberalisation. This is shown in a simplified form in Table 1. 
While there are many forms of liberalisation, depending on the economic situation, bargaining 
strength and political perspectives of the countries concerned, for present purposes we may classify 
them simply into two types. The first may be termed ‘neoclassical’: a rapid and sweeping opening up 
to market forces, with no underlying strategy and no attempt to coordinate the pace and spread of 
liberalisation with learning or re-learning processes and factor market improvements. The second may 
be termed ‘controlled’ liberalisation, with a slow and deliberate opening up, differentiated between 
activities, and with the government implementing a strategy of industrial upgrading and retaining 
powers of resource allocation. 
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Table 1: Industrial Response with Different Capabilities and Nature of Liberalisation 
Levels of Technological Development  Nature of 
Liberalisation  HIGH  LOW 
‘Neoclassical’:  
Rapid and sweeping exposure of 
protected activities to import 
competition, no government role in 
industrial investment allocation  
Decline in I-S industries except for 
those that have matured 
technologically or have resource 
advantages. Inflow of new technologies 
and improved quality but low 
technological dynamism (mainly in 
areas with low learning costs), slow 
growth of high-tech activities and 
exports  
[Examples: Chile and Brazil] 
Decline in most I-S industries, except 
in natural resource based activities and 
those not exposed to direct import 
competition.  Low rates of industrial 
and manufactured export growth and 
diversification; weak inflows of new 
technologies. Reversal to resource 
based comparative advantage. 
[Examples: Ghana and Tanzania]  
‘Controlled’:  
Increased export orientation with 
significant government intervention in 
resource allocation combined with 
gradual opening to import competition   
Growth of most industrial sectors with 
rising employment and exports, 
continued entry into more complex and 
heavy activities and growth of high-
tech exports. Infant industry targeting 
continues with liberalisation though 
with more indirect tools and guidance 
rather than direct ‘command’. 
[Examples: Korea and Taiwan] 
Growth of labour intensive and 
resource based activities, with some 
entry into more complex activities that 
become competitive in world markets. 
Technological development focused in 
activities with strong government 
support.  
[Example: Indonesia and Mexico] 
Similarly, levels of technological development between countries can be classified into two 
groups: ‘high’ and ‘low’. In the nature of phenomenon, technological capability is difficult to 
measure. Nevertheless, it is intuitively plausible to think of industrial sectors as being technologically 
strong or weak in terms of the complexities of technologies in use, their mastery of those technologies 
and their ability to adapt and improve upon technologies and generate new technologies.   
In sum, once it is accepted that technology has tacit elements that can only be mastered by 
prolonged, expensive, uncertain processes involving externalities and market failures, the neoclassical 
link between liberalisation and growth (and so employment) becomes conditional. There are certainly 
conditions in which it will obtain, where the requisite capabilities exist or can be developed in a short, 
foreseeable period with support from factor markets and institutions: fairly industrialized developing 
countries with active governments and developed supplier and institutional bases. There are other 
countries in which the result may well be the opposite, with closure of existing industrial capacity in 
the face of competition and little dynamism in export activities. The experience of East Asia 
illustrates the first outcome, that of Sub-Saharan Africa the second.  
This approach does not conflict with the empirical findings of Ghose (2000), it just casts a 
different light on the factors involved. In the end, the impact of trade liberalisation on employment 
remains conditional. Simple two factor models cannot explain the recent experience of developing 
countries in terms of industrial or export growth. While a part of the experience does seem to conform 
to standard predictions based on factor endowments, the underlying theory is deficient. The H-O 
model neglects such factors as learning, increasing returns, externalities, linkages and cumulative 
effects. These factors clearly affect comparative advantage, in two ways. First, where scale and 
agglomeration economies exist, countries can, ceteris paribus, establish competitive leads by being 
first movers and cumulatively increasing their lead over time. Second, where there are unpredictable, 
prolonged, costly and inter-linked learning processes, with diffuse externalities and failures in 
information markets, countries can improve their advantages by interventions to promote entry, 
overcome learning costs and co-ordinate inter-related activities. Moreover, if learning costs and risks 
rise with technological complexity, further interventions are needed to promote deepening. In these 
cases, improving skills is a necessary but not suffici ent condition for changing location advantages: 
there are other immobile complementary factors. Developing these generally involves market failures, 
so that comparative advantage depends on how failures are remedied. As noted, this ‘missing link’ 
between globalisation and employment creation is central to the analysis. 
It is important for the present discussion to understand the particular features of current globalisation. 
The list below notes those that are likely to affect employment in developing countries.  
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•  The shrinking of economic distance
16 affects the context for industrial development. In particular, 
the ‘natural protection’ that countries enjoyed in the past
17 is sharply reduced: international 
competition now appears far more quickly and intensely. Together with trade liberalisation, this 
forces industries to reach competitive ‘best practice’ frontiers very rapidly. At the same time, it 
opens up new opportunities. With well-known exceptions like agriculture, markets in developed 
countries are more open than before and developing country exporters can reach these markets 
more efficiently. It also allows developing countries to import foreign products, services and 
technologies more readily and cheaply and consumers to collect information at very low cost. 
There are mixed implications for employment: larger exports can promote it where countries have 
the wherewithal to compete in export markets, while intensified competition in domestic markets 
can lower it unless local enterprises build competitive capabilities quickly.  
•  The rapidity of technical change means that enterprises in all countries, regardless of the level of 
development, have to use new technologies to be competitive (new ‘technologies’ include not just 
products and processes but also new methods of organising firms, managing inter-firm relations 
and supply chains, linking to innovation and so on). Obsolete technologies tend to become 
uneconomic at all factor prices. Analysts like Freeman and Perez (1988) talk of a new ‘revolution’ 
in technology, so widespread and dramatic are its effects. The ability to generate employment 
depends on the ability of countries to promptly access and efficiently use new technologies.  
•  Every country has to engage in constant technological effort. Industrial leaders clearly have to 
invest in innovation, but followers (developing countries) also have to undertake technology 
generation, not to innovate but to absorb and adapt new technologies (Lall, 2001). Recent years 
have seen an unprecedented burst of research and development spending.
18 The pace, complexity 
and skill needs of technological effort force firms to specialize more narrowly and to share the 
risks and costs of innovation with other firms, opening up new avenues for spreading activity 
within globalised systems.  
•  Technical change affects all activities, but it benefits some more than others. Thus, innovation-
based manufacturing is gaining at the expense of others in both production and trade in almost all 
countries. Data from the US National Science Foundation (NSF 1999) show this clearly; note that 
the 68 countries in the sample account for over 95 per cent of global industrial activity (Table 2).  
Table 2: Annual growth rates of manufactures: high technology and total, 1985–1997 (percent) 
  All Production   All Exports  High-Tech Production  High-Tech Exports 
68 countries  7.30  5.90  10.80  12.70 
China  11.70  20.50  14.90  30.20 
Korea  10.20  10.60  15.40  18.70 
Singapore  8.00  15.00  13.10  21.70 
Taiwan   4.70  12.00  11.60  18.90 
Hong Kong  -0.20  13.50  3.50  18.10 
United States  2.90  8.80  4.70  10.10 
Germany   2.20  4.10  3.80  5.80 
UK  1.70  6.30  3.30  8.00 
Japan  1.70  2.40  5.20  4.40 
France  1.20  5.80  3.60  10.80 
Source: NSF (1999). 
                                                 
16 For instance, the cost of 1 megahertz of processing power has fallen from $7.6 thousand in 1970 to 17 cents by 1999, 
a decline of 99.9 per cent or 35 per cent per year over 30 years. The cost of sending 1 trillion bits has fallen from $150 
thousand to 12 cents. The entire contents of the US Library of Congress can now be transmitted across America for $40; 
soon it may be storable on one computer chip. In 1930 the cost of a minute’s telephone call from New York to London was 
$300 at today’s prices; today it is a few cents. 
17 Natural protection was historically enhanced by widespread protection of infant industries by the presently 
industrialized countries. See Chang (2002).  
18 Thus, per capita spending on enterprise-financed R&D in the industrial world rose from $122 in 1985 to $402 in 
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•  Patterns of global trade are changing in response not only to innovation but also to the relocation 
of activities, processes and functions from high to low cost regions. Trade in some products (like 
pharmaceuticals) grows rapidly mainly because of innovation, with little relocation to take 
advantage of low wages. Some (like apparel) are driven primarily by relocation; technical 
progress is slow and the income elasticity of demand is low. Some (like electronics) benefit from 
both innovation and relocation – they have low-technology assembly processes that can be placed 
in poor countries. Table 3 shows 1985 and 2000 values of world exports by technology, 
distinguishing between resource-based, low, medium and high technologies. Primary products 
grew the slowest, nearly halving their share of total exports. Resource-based manufactures 
followed. Low and medium-technology manufactures grew at more or less the same rate, both 
slightly raising their shares (a more detailed calculation, not reported here, shows that MT 
products grew faster than LT after 1995). The fastest-growing group was high-technology 
products. Industrial specialization is thus relevant to generating exports and employment, since 
the relocation of export-oriented activities to poorer countries is a major driver of employment. 
Table 3: Values and structure of world exports, 1985-2000 ($ million and %) 







All sectors  1,703,582,494  5,534,008,649  8.17%  100%  100% 
Primary Products  394,190,554  684,751,141  3.75%  23.1%  12.4% 
Manufactures   1,252,573,675  4,620,266,770  9.09%  73.5%  83.5% 
     Resource based   330,863,869  863,503,545  6.60%  19.4%  15.6% 
     Low Technology   241,796,065  862,998,972  8.85%  14.2%  15.6% 
      Medium Technology   485,784,011  1,639,871,870  8.45%  28.5%  29.6% 
      High Technology   198,029,682  1,269,587,194  13.19%  11.6%  22.9% 
           (of which, ICT)   90,151,843  773,119,244  15.40%  5.3%  14.0% 
Source: Calculations by UNCTAD based on UN Comtrade database, using classification developed by Lall (2001).  
•  Productive resources – goods, inputs, capital, technology and high-level skills – move around the 
world more easily and rapidly. A great deal of mobility does not involve ownership, but in general 
it does: thus, the role of transnational companies (TNCs) with affiliates under their direct control 
is growing. According to UNCTAD (2002.b), TNCs now account for around two-thirds of world 
trade. New organisational techniques and ICTs allow TNCs to spread their activities efficiently 
across greater distances. Their growth is accompanied by growing internalisation of the most 
valuable technologies, so that entering these activities necessarily involves TNC entry. 
Employment generation in such activities thus needs strategies to target and attract FDI. At the 
same time, competitive pressures are forcing TNCs to specialise more narrowly and hive off non-
core activities to other firms. This yields some unexpected results.
 19 It also opens up new growth 
opportunities for firms with the capabilities to meet the needs of technology-intensive TNCs.   
•  However, FDI in the developing world remains highly concentrated, and is growing more so over 
time (UNIDO, 2002). The share of the leading five and ten recipients of FDI has grown in the 
developing world, while declining in the world as a whole (Figure 1).  
FIGURE 1 
•  International  value chains are more tightly knit than before, both within firms (by TNCs
20) and 
externally (by contractual or informal relationships
21). As noted, functions and processes are being 
                                                 
19 An example is the growing use of ‘contract manufacturers’ by leading electronics firms: many are moving to only 
innovation and marketing, leaving production, procurement and logistics to unrelated firms (Sturgeon, 1997, UNCTAD, 
2002.b). 
20 Thus, some 30-40 percent of the trade handled by TNCs is actually within the firm (between different affiliated 
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subdivided and located across the globe to take advantage of fine differences in costs, logistics, 
markets and innovation.
22 The process is cumulative, with first movers building up leads based on 
learning and agglomeration economies. This ‘fragmentation’ (Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001, for a 
trade-theoretical analysis) is causing  large changes in the distribution of production and 
comparative advantage (Dicken, 1998, calls it ‘global shift’).   
•  Developing countries as a whole are doing well in trade. Their manufactured exports are growing 
faster than those of developed countries, which is to be expected since they started from a lower 
base. However, the patterns of their growth are interesting and unexpected. They grow more 
slowly than developed countries in primary products and resource-based manufactures (Figure 2), 
presumably because of the faster application of new technology or trade barriers in the industrial 
world. Within other manufactured products, their relative lead over industrial countries rises with 
technology levels. This is counterintuitive: theory would lead us to expect that developing 
countries would grow fastest relative to developed countries in low technology, less in medium 
technology, and least in high technology, products. The data show the reverse. Moreover, it is not 
just rates of growth that show this trend (due, say, to the small initial base of high-tech products); 
the values involved in technology intensive exports are also very large.
23  
FIGURE 2 
•  However, only a few countries have become significant players in global supply chains, even in 
low technology activities (and here one of the main drivers of relocation to low wage countries, 
the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, is about to expire). As UNCTAD (2002.b) and UNIDO (2002) 
note, large numbers of low wage countries are effectively marginalized. East Asia dominates the 
manufactured scene in the developing world; at the other end, Sub-Saharan Africa is virtually 
absent in sophisticated manufactured exports (Figure 3).  
FIGURE 3 
•  The determinants of competitive advantage are changing. Though some productive resources are 
more mobile than before, they do not spread evenly; they need strong complementary immobile 
resources to make them productive and, in a liberal world, competitive. The immobile resources 
that poor countries have to offer involve more than primary resources or cheap unskilled labour. 
They include new skills, technological competence, competitive supplier clusters, strong support 
institutions, good infrastructure and well-honed administrative capabilities. Attracting mobile 
resources in competition with other countries needs sophisticated strategies of FDI promotion, 
targeting and leveraging. The countries best able to develop local assets and strategies are the 
best placed to generate employment under the competitive conditions of globalisation.  
•  Competitive capabilities are unevenly distributed in the developing world, and are growing more 
so over time. UNIDO (2002) shows that such ‘drivers’ of industrial performance like skills, 
technological effort, FDI and technology licensing are diverging increasingly. East Asia is pulling 
rapidly ahead of other regions, and Africa is falling further behind. The closer integration of 
markets and liberalisation of policies does not reverse this divergence; in fact, it can make it 
worse by exposing economies to world markets before they are ready to cope, by constraining 
policies needed to build capabilities and shrinking government budgets. Figure 4 shows UNIDO 
                                                                                                                                                        
21 There is a tendency for lead firms to rely on a smaller number of ‘first tier’ suppliers, which in turn deal with and 
coordinate second and third tier suppliers. The first tier suppliers are major TNCs in their own right.  
22 In some low technology activities like apparel, lead coordinators are international buyers rather than TNCs. The role 
of direct ownership (FDI) in coordinating and managing globalised activities depends on the nature and pace of change of 
the technology and the availability of specialised suppliers; it is also changing rapidly over time as systems become more 
open. See UNCTAD (2000.b).   
23 High-technology exports are now the largest single component of developing country manufactured exports. In 
2000, at $445 billion, they were $60 billion  larger than developing country primary exports, $210 billion larger than 
resource-based manufactured exports, $39 billion larger than low technology exports and $140 billion larger than medium 
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data on the regional distribution of ‘competitive industrial performance’
24 and its main ‘drivers’ 
for 1985 and 1998. There is a clear correlation between regional performance and drivers; this 
relationship also holds at the country level (UNIDO, 2002, p. 71). 
FIGURE 4 
•  Finally, while integrated production systems can be powerful engines of employment creation, it 
is not clear how far they will extend in the developing world. Existing ones are unlikely to spread 
much more because of technological features; economies of scale, scope and agglomeration mean 
that they will concentrate in a few locations that can provide the critical mass of skills, suppliers, 
services and institutions they need to deploy new technologies efficiently. There is unlikely to be 
a cascading of production facilities to countries lower down in the ladder: on the contrary, there 
may be discontinuities in the relocation process. Once established in particular countries, TNCs 
are likely to ‘stick’ for long periods, at least until wage and congestion costs rise to uneconomic 
levels or the relevant skills run out.
25 This means that the employment potential of such value 
chains as electronics and automobiles is likely to remain concentrated. 
•  At the same time, the globalisation of manufacturing and services is in its infancy and new 
production systems may arise. In the low technology area, the main activity  – clothing and 
apparel  – may carry on spreading to new locations even after the end of the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement in 2005. ICT based services will certainly continue to grow in low wage locations. 
Resource based activities may transfer more value-added activities to raw material suppliers.  
This background suggests that there is likely to be enormous variation in the employment 
effect of globalisation, with the crucial factor being the ability of countries to build strong competitive 
capabilities and attract investments from abroad. While new technologies allow finer specialization 
and more relocation, the beneficiaries may remain few in number. However, the dynamics of 
globalisation and location remain uncertain and changeable, and it is important for all countries to 
gear themselves as much as possible to its competitive needs.  
TNCs generate employment in  three ways. They employ people in their plants ( direct 
employment). They create employment in suppliers and service providers, as well as in other affiliates 
that are attracted to the country by the original investors (indirect employment). And they create 
employment by adding to incomes that lead to higher consumption, savings, and investment (tertiary 
employment). These positive effects have to be set against the potential loss of employment caused by 
TNCs. Foreign entry may force existing firms out of business or induce local competitors to shed 
employees. If entry is by acquiring local firms, it may lead to significant redundancies. These effects 
may also vary over time. The short-term loss of employment may be more than offset by longer-term 
gains if FDI raises the competitiveness, efficiency and export-orientation of domestic firms, or 
generates new local suppliers. On the other hand, if FDI adversely affects local enterprise 
development and holds back technology upgrading, the long-term employment and skill effects may 
be even worse. Since it is very difficult to specify the counterfactual – what would have happened if 
the FDI had not taken place – the final net effects are almost impossible to measure rigorously. The 
discussion of such effects of FDI remains largely in the realm of conjecture.  
Direct employment: Direct employment generation in host economies by FDI depends on 
several factors. First, employment effects differ by mode of entry. The size of employment generated 
depends on whether investment is in green-field sites, joint ventures, or mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As). In developed countries, M&As almost invariably lead to labour shedding, either 
immediately or with a time lag. In developing countries, the net effect is less clear: some M&As 
                                                 
24 The UNIDO competitive industrial performance index is an unweighted average for each country of manufacturing 
value added per capita, manufactured exports per capita, the share of medium and high technology industries in MVA and 
the same share in manufactured exports. See UNIDO (2002). 
25 This is a danger for countries without strong local industrial capabilities that have benefited from recent TNC 
relocation, like Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. These countries face a strong challenge from China, with lower 
wages, more low-level skilled labour, a large supply of technical manpower and a developed supplier base. See Lall (2001).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS93   Page 15 
salvage moribund firms and contribute to conserving employment (See Part I for a comprehensive 
discussion of M&A effects). Others reduce total employment in the host economy by dismissing 
labour or out-competing local firms. Whether or not employment subsequently rebounds depends on a 
host of factors, including productivity, multiplier and growth effects. Unfortunately, comprehensive 
quantitative assessments, tracing employment levels over time for different M&As, are scarce.  
Second, employment by TNCs (at least in tradable activities) also depends on the trade and 
industrial policies of the host economy. Ceteris paribus, export-oriented regimes with abundant, 
cheap labour and a conducive environment for FDI can have significant employment generation by 
TNCs. As the early experience of East Asia shows, simple processing activities for exports – in some 
countries with substantial local participation – creates large numbers of (initially low wage and low 
skill) jobs. Whether this employment is sustainable over time is a different matter: this depends on 
whether TNCs deepen and improve their technologies and skills as wages rise. Import-substituting 
regimes can stimulate employment generation in the initial stages; however, growth tends to slow 
over time if high levels of protection are maintained and lead to inefficiencies and technological lags. 
Similarly, domestic competition policies can affect the creation of employment. In general, 
competitive settings tend to generate more sustainable growth, place fewer barriers to the entry of new 
firms (especially SMEs) and encourage greater flexibility.  
Since most countries are moving to more liberal trade and i ndustrial regimes, employment 
effects in tradable activities will, as noted, depend partly on how quickly these activities restructure to 
face international competition. It will also depend on whether new FDI flows in: while large domestic 
markets will remain a strong magnet, the growth of employment will depend increasingly on the host 
economy’s competitive capabilities. Thus, economies that can support rapid restructuring and efficient 
new productive activities will see FDI-driven employment growth in the tradable sector. Others may 
not. Their employment growth will come from non-tradable service activities like tourism, where FDI 
can play an important role. A few advanced host economies, like Singapore and Hong Kong China, 
can move into high technology services like finance or regional headquarters, with TNCs providing 
vital skills and links to the global economy.  
The experience of TNCs in liberalising host countries is mixed. Some liberalising economies 
have enjoyed sustained employment growth, particularly those that had a strong export sector to start 
with and could maintain export growth. Many others, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and in parts of 
Latin America, are suffering declines in output and formal sector employment (ILO WER 1996/97, 
pp. 157 ff.). TNCs can and do play a positive role in restructuring industrial activities; however, this is 
mainly in countries where there is a suitable base of domestic capabilities. In other circumstances, the 
combination of trade liberalisation and globalisation has negative effects on employment and wages. 
The third factor is the efficiency of the  labour market and the quality of labour market 
institutions, such as labour laws and trade unions, in the host economy. Similarly, if gender or 
ethnicity leads to segregation in employment (labour market segmentation), investments are likely to 
create less employment or upgrade it less efficiently than where labour markets work well. Many 
developing host countries suffer a number of information, coordination and other failures, which limit 
their ability to respond to market needs, furnish new skills or safeguard the interests of employees.  
Indirect and tertiary employment: Where local linkages are strong, indirect employment 
created by TNCs can be significantly larger than that created directly. For the manufacturing sector as 
a whole, indirect employment effects in the formal sector range between 1 and 2 times the number of 
jobs created directly in affiliates. Depending on the activity and product, supplier capabilities, the 
extent of outsourcing and size of the affiliate, the multiplier can be much larger. Activities that 
involve a large number of input suppliers (like food processing) or subcontractors and service firms 
(engineering and electrical products) tend to generate substantial indirect employment. In the latter 
category, however, the effect depends on the level of sophistication of the supplier network.   
Employment linkages change over time. To start with (and unless compelled otherwise), 
foreign affiliates p refer to source inputs, intermediates and services from overseas suppliers with 
whom they have strong linkages. However, all else being equal, firms also prefer to have suppliers 
nearby. As new FDI flows in and domestic capabilities develop, supplier relationships change. In QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS93   Page 16 
advanced technologies, affiliates often induce their traditional suppliers to invest in their proximity; 
this has been the main reason for a significant increase in local content in Malaysian electronics 
TNCs. In technologies where local firms have good capabilities (or can be brought to acceptable 
levels with some assistance), TNCs often develop local supply networks. Where domestic capabilities 
are weak, however, such linkages are unlikely to appear or grow. Premature liberalisation without 
investment in skills and capabilities can hold back the development of supplier capabilities, and so 
constrict the growth for indirect employment.  
What may we conclude about TNCs as agents of globalisation and employment? As with 
trade and liberalisation, there is no clear-cut outcome – it all depends. TNCs do have the potential to 
add to employment, if they bring net additional resources to the host economy and do not have large 
negative effects on employment by local firms. This potential is particularly large for export-oriented 
global sourcing operations, which in technology intensive activities involves integrated production 
systems. Whether or not a particular country gains depends on its attractions as a location for FDI – in 
a globalising  world, that is, on its competitiveness – and the capabilities of local firms. Countries like 
Malaysia, Thailand, Mexico and China have gained substantial new employment from FDI.  A much 
larger number of others have gained relatively little.  
This has not taken into account the generation of employment in service activities by TNCs. 
This is again a very promising area, particularly in functions that can now be easily relocated by the 
use new ICTs. The explosion of software, data entry, back-office services and similar activities in 
India is one example.
26 A large part is handled by local companies subcontracting to clients overseas, 
but there is also rapid growth of foreign affiliates, many of which are expanding local design and 
development activities in India.   
In sum, therefore, the FDI aspect of globalisation offers substantial employment benefits to 
the countries that are able attract, retain and leverage it. Very few developing countries, unfortunately, 
fall into this category. And some of those that do face serious challenges as wages rise and cheaper 
competitors emerge. Again, the critical variable is the ability to provide a competitive setting for 
TNCs to locate operations, not based just on low wages but on the whole range of capabilities that is 
now needed for modern industry.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Globalisation can offer many employment benefits to developing countries. In the external world 
these countries face, markets become more accessible, transport costs lower, information easier to get, 
technology easier to access and capital easier to raise: this promises more exports, faster transfer of 
technology and greater investment resources. On the domestic front, closer integration with the world 
economy also promises much. Trade liberalisation, according to received trade theory, promotes 
labour-intensity in (export and domestic-oriented) activities and so boosts employment. Investment 
liberalisation leads to larger inflows of technology, information, capital, skills and various services, 
often in a ‘packaged’ form that lets them be deployed quickly and efficiently. It may also give access 
to the internal production systems of TNCs that increasingly span the world and offer massive 
markets, rapid growth and technological as well as employment benefits. Opening the economy to 
international service and infrastructure providers can help create jobs, raise productivity and 
strengthen competitiveness. It is not just foreign firms that benefit: local enterprises can respond to 
more intense competition and new market opportunities by raising their productivity and collaborating 
with, learning from and supplying to TNCs.  
In general, therefore, globalisation can, by rationalising activity across national boundaries 
and integrating countries into a more efficient system where mobile resources exploit the specific 
                                                 
26 Software and related services have been among India's fastest growing export items, averaging 40 per cent per annum 
in 1988-2002, and expanding from $70 million to a projected 7.6 billion in 2001-2002. Industry experts estimate that this 
industry accounted for 16 per cent of India’s total exports in 2000-2001; employed 5 million people; and received $1.6 
billion in investments. 
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advantages of each location, boost activity and supply the ‘missing elements’ to make local factors or 
enterprises competitive. In an era of explosive innovation, it also offers a wealth of new, highly 
productive technologies whose dissemination can raise living standards in developing countries (in 
non-traded as well as traded activities). There is clear evidence that several developing countries have 
enjoyed rapid and sustained output, export and employment growth  by participating in globalisation 
(UNIDO, 2002).   
Given this immense productive, absorptive, allocative and resource transfer potential of 
globalisation, it may seem that simply opening economies up to global market forces is a good  – 
perhaps the only – way to promote employment and growth today. This is indeed the position of many 
analysts and the Washington Consensus is built on just this premise. One strong version of this 
approach, ‘neoliberalism’, holds that the more rapidly and completely governments withdraw from 
intervening in markets, the more their economies benefit: markets are always efficient, and globalised 
markets today are exceptionally so because they carry so much greater potential. 
Unfortunately, this conclusion is unwarranted. Doubts can be raised at both the theoretical 
and empirical levels regarding the employment benefits of globalisation for the ‘typical’ developing 
country. The theory that predicts a rise in employment from greater openness to trade is based on 
strong simplifying assumptions that ignore the realities of competitive advantage. Rapid exposure to 
market forces in a world of falling ‘natural protection’ (i.e. lower transaction costs), may in fact 
reduce employment and freeze comparative advantage in stagnant or low-return activities. Even 
where a shift to labour-intensive activities takes place, it may not raise net employment if it destroys 
local enterprises without stimulating the growth of new, more efficient ones. Over time, the initial 
stimulus to employment may not be sustainable in an intensely competitive setting unless specific 
policies are undertaken to build new capabilities. The missing link is national capabilities – and there 
is no generalisation possible on how globalisation affects these in particular countries.   
FDI continues to be highly concentrated. The level of concentration is rising over time in the 
developing world, and, given path-dependent and cumulative factors may carry on doing so for some 
time, at least for global sourcing activities. In a globalising world mobile resources focus on a few 
locations with competitive complementary resources: given strong economies of scale, scope and 
agglomeration, global production systems tend to become increasingly concentrated. Countries that 
plug into globalisation efficiently need to intervene extensively to build international links and 
leverage them successfully (UNIDO, 2002). The success stories in the developing world may thus be 
the exception rather than the rule; their experience may well reflect other  factors – government 
strategy, location or just good luck – rather than the beneficial effects of global market forces per se. 
More generally, intense and rapid exposure to market forces can damage economies that 
suffer from market and institutional failures that affect their competitive response to global 
competitors and technologies and that they are not able to remedy. What is more, these failures may 
be cumulative and self-reinforcing rather temporary (an adjustment ‘J-curve’ that comes to an end 
when policy reform is complete, with the economy moving to higher growth). There may be nothing 
inbuilt in the globalisation process that leads to sustained growth if action is not taken to remedy the 
failures. There may, on the contrary, be systemic forces that make for continuing divergence between 
economies; and the policy pressures that accompany globalisation may actually reduce the ability of 
governments to take remedial action.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS93   Page 18 
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Figure 4: UNIDO Competitive Industrial Performance Index and Drivers 